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Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug advisory committee members sometimes have financial
interests tied to drug companies. Congress and the public have become concerned that these financial
interests lead to conflicts of interest. They conclude that the conflicts bias committee recommendations,
and lead to unsafe or ineffective drugs being approved for public consumption, or, conversely, delays
in approval of safe and effective drugs. Our paper provides empirical evidence, based on an event
study methodology, that advisory committee meetings lead to weak or statistically insignificant effects
on stock prices and hence equity values of regulated companies assumed to be affected by the particular
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I.  Introduction  
 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advisory committee members sometimes 
have financial interests tied to companies whose products are evaluated by their 
committees. Congress, public interest groups, and the press have become increasingly 
concerned about these financial interests.
1 They worry that the advice offered by advisory 
committee members may be biased; thus undermining the integrity of the processes that 
FDA uses to solicit outside advice to inform regulatory decisions. Our paper provides 
financial market evidence of weak or statistically insignificant effects of advisory 
committee actions on stock market values, an accepted measure of the value of a 
company (and a measure of the potential direct benefits to committee members holding 
stocks in these companies as well as potential indirect benefits to committee members 
with other financial ties to these companies).  
  Our analysis distinguishes between two types of meetings and finds evidence 
suggesting different stock price effects.   Product-specific meetings may deal with such 
things as approval or labeling of an individual product.  Meetings on general topics 
address regulatory issues affecting many firms, as many as the entire pharmaceutical 
industry.  We find no evidence of effects of general topic meetings on stock prices.  We 
do find, however, evidence of some statistically significant but mostly weak negative 
effects of product specific advisory committee meetings on stock prices of affected firms.  
                                                 
1 See for example, Congressional Record, H4247 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. Stupak); 
Steinbrook, R., “Financial Conflicts of Interest and the Food and Drug Administration’s Advisory 
Committees,” New Engl. J. Med., 353: 116-117 (July 14, 2005); Lurie, P., et al., “Financial Conflicts of 
Interest Disclosure and Voting Patterns at Food and Drug Administration Drug Advisory Committee 
Meetings,” JAMA, 295: 1921-1928 (Apr. 26, 2006); Saul S. “Panel backs drug amid conflict concerns,” 
New York Times, September 10, 2005:C3.    4
  In the rest of the paper we discuss the institutional and legal background of 
conflicts of interest and FDA’s advisory committees, measurement of the effects of 
advisory committee meetings, a description of the results, and then our conclusions.  
II.  Background 
  FDA advisory committees play a vital role in furthering FDA’s mission to protect 
and promote public health.  Through advisory committees, FDA obtains independent, 
expert advice on issues relating to human drugs, animal drugs, biological products (such 
as vaccines and blood products), medical devices, and food. In general, drug advisory 
committees include consumer representatives, a patient representative, industry 
representatives (who do not vote) and at least two technically qualified experts who 
specialize in the drug or disease.  
FDA advisory committees have been subject to increased scrutiny.  In particular, 
members of the public, Congress, and consumer groups have focused attention on 
advisory committee members’ potential conflicts of interest and how FDA reviews and 
grants waivers of conflict of interest. 
Federal law
2 requires that individuals invited to attend an FDA advisory 
committee meeting as a special government employee (SGE) or regular government 
employee (RGE) report to the agency all financial interests relevant to the topics to be 
discussed at the advisory committee meeting.  Individuals are required to report personal 
financial interests, such as stock in a regulated company and consulting fees received 
from a regulated company.  In addition, individuals must report financial interests 
imputed to them through their spouse, minor children, employer, prospective employer, 
general partner, and organizations in which they serve as an officer, director, trustee, or 
                                                 
2 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app., Title I (P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824)   5
general partner.  The law considers a financial interest to be a potential conflict of interest 
if the discussions and potential outcomes of the advisory committee meeting will have a 
direct and predictable effect on the financial interest.
3 
If an individual has a potential conflict of interest, he or she may not participate in 
the meeting unless the agency determines that the criteria for a waiver of conflict of 
interest are met and such waiver is granted. Under current law and FDA policy, FDA 
grants a waiver only if it is necessary to afford the advisory committee essential 
expertise, the aggregate amount of potentially conflicting personal financial interests is 
$50,000 or less, and granting the waiver would be consistent with the statutory cap on the 
number of waivers that may be issued for the year.
4 
Individuals with substantial or closely related financial interests are either 
excluded from the committee meetings or not allowed to vote. Those with moderate to 
small or more remote financial interests sometimes are given waivers and allowed to 
participate because of their unique expertise. For example, a committee member could 
hold $25,000 worth of a drug stock or have earned a $10,000 consulting fee from a drug 
company and still be selected for the committee and allowed to vote. As of March 1, 
2009, FDA operated 48 advisory committees and panels (16 for drugs), and, collectively, 
these committees had 592 members.   
  For the above mentioned reasons, Congress, the public, and regulators have been 
understandably concerned that some advisory committee members’ financial interests are 
                                                 
3 18 U.S.C. 208; 21 U.S.C. 379d-1 (added by the Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. Law 
No.110-85, sec. 701) 
4 See Guidance for the Public, FDA Advisory Committee Members, and FDA Staff on Procedures for 
Determining Conflict of Interest and Eligibility for Participation in FDA Advisory Committees, August 
2008, accessed at:  
http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/GuidancePolicyRegs/ACWaiverCriteriaFINALGuidance080408.pdf   6
conflicts of interest that could lead to bias. They worry that FDA’s decisions to grant 
conflict of interest waivers to some experts with financial interests undermines the 
objectivity of the advisory committees’ recommendations
5. A widely cited study of FDA 
drug advisory committee members’ conflicts of interest found that 73 percent of advisory 
meetings involved at least one member with a conflict (Lurie et al., 2006). The 
researchers found well over 60 percent of the conflicts consisted of members owning 
drug company stocks or receiving consulting fees from drug companies. They further 
found that conflicted members typically voted in favor of drug approvals more frequently 
than non-conflicted members.
6  
In that study, a member was defined to be conflicted if he had any financial 
interest in a potentially affected drug firm, not just the firm whose drug was up for 
approval. For example, a member who had a financial interest in a firm that makes a 
competing product to the subject drug was considered to be conflicted, as was a member 
who had a financial interest in the subject drug firm.  An assumption underlying this 
definition is that financial benefits generated from any drug firm make or identify a 
committee member more favorably predisposed to the drug industry in general, and more 
likely to vote in favor of drug approvals. This assumption is common in the 
Congressional record, the popular press, and the academic press. FDA has previously 
articulated flaws with this study. An FDA paper published by the Center for Medicine in 
the Public Interest (also described in Biotechnology Law Report 25:5 (2006) describes 
flaws in the methodology used in the Lurie et al. paper (2006). Specifically, the FDA 
paper stated the following: 
                                                 
5 Congressional Record H4245 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. Hinchey). 
6  Lurie, P., et al., “Financial Conflicts of Interest Disclosure and Voting Patterns at Food and Drug 
Administration Drug Advisory Committee Meetings,” JAMA, 295: 1921-1928 (Apr. 26, 2006).   7
“Rather than asking whether having a financial tie to any pharmaceutical company tends 
to increase votes in support of a drug (a notion inconsistent with conventional 
interpretations of conflict of interest), we ask whether having a financial interest tends to 
increase votes in favor of that interest.” 
 
The FDA study’s re-interpretation of the Lurie et al. results suggests that committee 
members with a financial interest in a particular company were less likely to vote in favor 
of that pharmaceutical company’s interests than members without any financial ties. The 
paper also determined that committee members with financial ties to competing firms (for 
whom a vote of “yes” on a particular drug could be interpreted as a vote against the 
financial interest of the firm with which the member has financial ties) were more likely 
to vote against the financial interest of the companies with which they have financial ties 
compared to committee members with no financial ties. Finally, the FDA study reiterates 
the Lurie et al. finding that if all members of the advisory committees had been excluded 
from voting, not a single outcome of the 76 advisory committee meetings would have 
been altered.  
III. Measuring the Effects of Advisory Committee Meetings  
Previous studies on conflicted advisory committee members have focused on 
member qualifications and meeting outcomes. In this paper, we use stock returns to 
measure the effects of committee meetings on firms’ financial interests.  As described 
above, the legal standard for identifying conflicts of interest is whether the particular 
matter (i.e., advisory committee meeting topic) in which the federal employee 
participates would have a direct and predictable effect on the federal employee’s financial 
interests.  Thus, the existence of measurable stock price effects suggests such effects are 
direct and predictable, and the absence of measurable stock price effects would raise 
questions about the directness and predictability of such effects.  In the absence of   8
measurable stock price effects, companies--and the interests of committee members in 
such companies--may still gain, but only insofar as the effects of the committees’ 
deliberations were either anticipated by the market so that there is no “surprise” or so 
small that no effect was measurable.  In the finance literature, use of stock prices to 
evaluate effects of events on market value is called an “event study.”
7 
Our tests avoid having us decide which new drugs merit approval. They rely on 
the assumption that stock prices are set efficiently; a widely held view in the finance 
literature. The idea is that all publicly available information relevant to valuing a 
company’s stock is reflected in its price. This view seems appropriate here because 
information on potential new drugs attracts a great deal of attention from investors and 
Wall Street investment firms hire many drug industry experts to assist them in valuing 
drug stocks.
8 If a stock is priced too high (low) given what investors know about its 
prospects, investors sell (buy) the shares, thus forcing down (up) its price until it returns 
to its proper price. Thus, drug companies’ stock prices should reflect all publicly 
available information about the likelihood of a new drug being recommended for 
approval by an advisory committee.  
The relative rarity of event studies in the medical literature suggests further 
explanation is merited.
9 Simply stated, the result of an event study is the portion of a 
stock’s return caused by an information surprise. An example of a surprise is when 
traders expect an advisory committee to recommend approval of a drug but instead they 
                                                 
7 Brown, S., Warner, J., “Measuring Stock Price Performance,” J. Financial Economics, 8: 205-232 (Sept.  
1980). 
 
8 Steinbrook, R, “Wall Street and Clinical Trials,” New Engl. J. Med, 353: 1091-1093 (Sept. 15, 2005). 
 
9 Oberholzer-Gee, F, Inamndar S, “Merck’s Recall of Rofecoxib – a Strategic Perspective,” New Engl. J. 
Med, 351: 2147-2149 (Nov. 18, 2004).   9
recommend against approval. The surprise or “abnormal” portion of the associated drug 
stock’s return is computed by subtracting the company’s normal (expected) return from 
what the stock actually earned over the days surrounding the announcement of rejection. 
Stock return data is obtained from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
the most common source used in the finance literature. The appendix provides the more 
technical details of the event study method. 
  Our sample of events covers most of the FDA advisory committee meetings that 
occurred in 2006.  Some meetings involved companies that are privately held or whose 
stocks are solely traded on foreign exchanges.  The CRSP data base does not contain 
stock returns for these firms; hence, we could not include these companies in our study. 
Nevertheless, the sample is likely to represent the exploitable effects of the events 
reasonably well because CRSP covers the foreign pharmaceutical firms whose stocks are 
traded in the U.S., and because most of the excluded firms are privately held. Advisory 
committee members are unlikely to own shares of private companies because private 
stock is not available for purchase on stock exchanges.  
We examined 24 out of the 31 drug advisory committee meetings held during 
2006. Ten meetings were product-specific (drug-specific) meetings, and the remaining 14 
were general topic meetings.
10  Each meeting provides a vote announcement, which is 
defined as an event. The FDA provided the names of the firms potentially affected by the 
questions voted on at each meeting. We dropped four product-specific meetings and 
another three general topic meetings because they did not involve a publicly-traded firm. 
                                                 
10 Regulations of the Office of Government Ethics refer to particular matters involving specific parties (5 
CFR 2640.102(l)) and particular matters of general applicability (5 CFR 2640.102(m)).  For simplicity, we 
use product specific and general topic meetings to refer to these two types of particular matters.    10
Two product-specific meetings actually considered two separate drugs, each sponsored 
by a different company; hence, these two meetings provide four product-specific events. 
We ran an event study to measure the abnormal return for each of the 12 
individual firms potentially impacted by the 10 product-specific meetings. As is common 
for event studies, we also formed an equally-weighted stock portfolio of all 12 stocks’ 
abnormal return to measure an overall average impact of the committee announcements 
for the group. We performed the same analysis for each general topic meeting, since each 
meeting’s announcement impacted several firms, and then formed a portfolio of all firms 
impacted by general meeting announcements to measure an overall average impact for all 
of the groups combined.   
Figure 1 illustrates the basic structure of the data used to measure an abnormal 
return for each company. The day that the results of the voting are announced is labeled 
day 0; that is the event day. One could simply compute the abnormal stock return on that 
day to measure the effect of any surprise announcement on a particular company’s stock, 
but the typical event study reports the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) for the 
event day plus some trading days around the event. For example, the trade day that 
occurs 3 days before the event is labeled -3 in the figure. The reason most event studies 
include the surrounding days’ abnormal returns is that some information leakage could 
occur just before the event, or it could take some time following the event for the 
information to be fully digested by the traders.  In 2006, FDA generally posted on its 
website briefing materials for members of its advisory committee at least 24 hours prior 
to the start of the advisory committee.   
   11
  Trade days preceding the event       Trade days following the event 
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
          -5        -4        -3        -2         -1         0         1          2          3         4          5 
      
Figure 1. The Time-Line of Return Data Used to Compute Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Using a “window” of days around the event is particularly appropriate for FDA 
meeting announcements.  Furthermore, some meetings take place over two days and 
information leaks on the progress of the voting could occur on the first day. To account 
for potential information leaks or lags, we report CARs for one day before and one day 
after the meeting announcement day (three trading days),  five days before and five days 
after the meeting announcement day (11 trading days), and 21 days before and 21 day 
after the meeting announcement day (43 trading days). The three event windows in the 
tables of results are designated by (-1, 1), (-5, 5), and (-21, 21).  
We report results for three different windows for a number of reasons.  First, 
results for different windows illustrate the robustness of the results.  Second, some 
meetings cover two days.  We set the event day as the second of the two days because 
announcements from the meetings are more likely to come on the final day, but 
information leakage is possible on the preceding day.  Therefore, the three-day event 
period is the shortest time period that reasonably covers the event’s effects while 
minimizing the chance that some other confounding event occurs during the event period. 
Third, the (-5, 5) window allows a greater coverage of leak or lag effects, but increases 
the chance that the firms involved are affected by some other event that is then   12
mistakenly attributed to the FDA meeting. Nevertheless, the chance of this occurring for 
many firms during the window is small.  Finally, the (-21, 21) window can provide 
evidence about whether information is impounded in the affected stocks well before the 
meeting is even held.  This could indicate early leakage of information before any public 
news source is able to obtain and report on the information.  Of course, this longer period 
is also more likely to contain confounding events. 
IV. Description of Results 
  We present the separate event results in tables below.  Each entry in the table is 
either a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over a particular event window or its 
associated t-statistic.  The CAR measures the stock or portfolio return after adjusting for 
the risk of the stock or portfolio of stocks.  The t-statistic can be used to test the 
hypothesis that a CAR is statistically different from zero.  For our purposes, we employ a 
two-tailed test, and take a t-statistic with a magnitude greater than 2 to indicate a 
statistically significant CAR at the 5 percent level.  
  As shown in Table 1, the CARs for companies affected by general topic meetings 
are consistent with what we would ordinarily expect to have happened by chance alone.
11  
Company names are withheld for privacy reasons. Some firms were named in  several 
meetings but many firms appear only once; hence, the results are not driven by a few 
firms who appear over and over again. 
                                                 
11 To illustrate the questions put before advisory committees meeting to address general topic, we provide a 
an example.  On February 9, 2006,  the Cellular, Tissue and Gene Therapies Advisory Committee 
discussed issues surrounding potency measurements for cellular and gene transfer products. One question 
asked of the committee was: In the context of Cellular and Gene Therapy products, what assay design 
schemes would be necessary to successfully validate biological assays and allow accurate quantification 
and interpretation of the results obtained?  In contrast, for the product-specific meeting held by the Anti-
infective Drugs Advisory Committee on March 6, 2006 a question posed was: Do data from the pivotal 
study provide substantial evidence of safety and efficacy of [the drug] daptomycin in the treatment of 
staphylococcus aureus bacteremia? 
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Our hypothesis for the effects of general topic meetings is that they should be 
small overall because of the general nature of the topics and therefore the more 
unpredictable the effects of committee recommendations on a firm’s profitability.   At the 
bottom of the table we report the CARs for a combined portfolio of all of the firms in all 
14 events. We find that the overall effects for the 14 meetings combined are very small; 
over the (-1, 1), (-5, 5), and (-21, 21) windows, the CARs are -0.09, 0.48 and -2.41 
percent, respectively.  None of these CARs is statistically significant.   
We recognize that combining all of the meetings’ effects could mask a relatively 
large effect for a few meetings, or that large positive effects of some meetings could 
offset large negative effects of other meetings. To consider this possibility, we measure 
and report the effect for each meeting. The CARs measuring the effect of a meeting is 
designated as “Portfolio” under the company number column. Given the 14 events 
(meetings) and three windows per event, there are 42 CARs to consider. We find that 
none of the 42 CARs for the portfolios are statistically significant. Furthermore, the point 
estimates of the CARs over the three-day event period are all very small – less than one 
percent except for two cases which are less than two percent. And the signs of the CARs 
are about evenly distributed between positive (22) and negative (20) CARs. 
  Finally, we considered the possibility that these portfolio-level results masked 
some large effects of the meeting announcements on individual companies. There are a 
total of 279 company-level CARs, but only 5 are statistically significant. If we assume 
that we could observe up to five percent statistically significant CARs by chance 
(approximately 14 in this case), the 5 statistically significant CARs can easily be 
attributed to chance.  Furthermore, there are three statistically significant negative CARs   14
and two statistically significant positive CARs. Therefore, our evidence supports our 
hypothesis that the announcements of votes from general topic meetings should hold few 
large surprises, and therefore, have no substantial overall impact on the companies’ stock 
prices. 
  Table 2 reports results for the company-specific meeting events using a similar 
format. Our hypothesis is that occasionally there will be statistically significant effects of 
company-specific meeting announcements on the stocks of companies whose drug 
products are under consideration by the committee. We find that the overall effects on the 
12 companies involved in company-specific events are larger in magnitude than those 
observed for the general topic meeting effects. The CARs for the portfolio of the 12 
companies over the (-1, 1), (-5, 5), and (-21, 21) windows are   -2.48, -11.15, and -5.91 
percent, respectively.  The (-1, 1) and (-5, 5) window CARs are statistically significant. 
We report a total of 36 company-specific CARs for the 12 companies and find that 5 are 
statistically significant.  More than ten percent of the CARs are statistically significant, 
which indicates that the results are unlikely to be due to chance. Furthermore, four of the 
five statistically significant CARs are negative. 
  The empirical results in Tables 1 and 2 support our hypotheses. There appear to 
be very few surprises in the general topic meetings but a statistically significant number 
of surprises (mostly negative) in the product-specific announcements. The results are 
based upon one year of meetings; hence, they are not conclusive.   An open question is 
why the surprises tend to be negative rather than positive for the meetings with product 
specific topics.  
   15
VI. Conclusion 
  Overall, this study implies that advisory committee meetings provide little 
additional information about a drug product’s expected sales and therefore rarely move 
stock prices. The study finds that FDA advisory committee meetings involving general 
topics have no statistically significant impact on stock prices. Some FDA meetings 
involving company-specific topics produce statistically significant but usually small 
negative stock price effects.  Assuming that drug stocks are priced reasonably efficiently, 
these results show that investors are not surprised by the voting results announced at 
general topic meetings, but that such surprises sometimes occur at the product specific 
meetings and these surprises are negative. We suggest that the reason for this difference 
is that the general topics may have intrinsically less predictable effects on stock prices.   
    16
Appendix: Event Study Details 
 
We computed all event-study results using Eventus software, the CRSP returns 
data set, and the market model.  The market model is used as part of a common method to 
compute an abnormal return.  The model defines the return one can expect from a stock 
on a particular trading day, given the stock’s risk (beta) and the market return for the day. 
A stock’s beta is a measure of its risk relative to the stock market as a whole. By 
definition, the market beta has a value of 1. A stock that is twice (half) as risky as the 
stock market has a beta of 2 (0.5). On days when the stock market increases (decreases) 
by, say, 2%, a stock with a beta of 2 should increase (decrease) by 4%. 
 The market model parameters (beta and alpha) for each firm are estimated with 
daily returns from a period preceding the event, in this case, starting 46 trading days 
before the event and going backward in time at least 63 trading days (three months) and 
up to 255 trading days (one year) if a company has 255 days available in the CRSP data 
set.  The market model is 
 R it = αi + βiRmt + εit           ( 1 )  
where Rit  is firm i’s daily stock return on day t, Rmt is the market return on day t 
represented by the CRSP equal-weighted index return, αi and βi are the market model 
parameters measured by ordinary least squares coefficients for firm i, and εit in the error 
term for firm i at time t. Here we use up to one year of a firm’s daily stock returns to 
gauge its risk. The returns come from a time period before the event windows so that the 
event itself does not influence the risk measure. 
  The normal or expected return on a particular day t, for stock i is measured as:   17
mt i i it R R E
^ ^
] [ β α + = .          ( 2 )  
The coefficients in (1) are estimated over the 255 trading days before the event window. 
They are used to calculate, Ait, the risk-adjusted (abnormal) return on a particular day t 
for firm i as, 
  mt i i it it it it R R R E R A
^ ^
] [ β α − − = − =  . 
We compound these abnormal returns over the days of the event window to find the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a single firm.  
When more than one firm is potentially affected by an event, in addition to 
reporting the individual firm CARs, we also report an average CAR for the portfolio of 
firms potentially affected by the event.  We test these CARs for an overall event effect. 
This portfolio average CAR is computed by averaging the abnormal returns for the firms 
on each event day in the window, and then compounding these average returns over the 
event window. 
CARs are measured over three event windows and their statistical significance is 
tested with a t-statistic.  The CAR t-statistic is computed using the time-series standard 
deviation of the returns for either an individual stock or the portfolio of stocks potentially 
impacted by the given event.  We report results for there event windows: a short window 
of (-1, 1), a medium window of (-5, 5), and a long window of (-21, 21). 
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Table 1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for Various Windows Around the 
 Announcements of Votes from General Topic Advisory Committee Meetings 
 




Window  (-1, 1) 
Medium Event 
Window  (-5, 5) 
Long Event 
Window (-21, 21) 
    CAR T-stat  CAR T-stat  CAR T-stat 
          
1. February 10, 2006  1-1  -1.11 -0.393 13.15  2.424*  -10.47 -0.980
 1-2  -2.80 -0.427 -8.35  -0.662  2.95 0.119
 1-3  -1.45 -0.221 4.68  0.372  -21.22 -0.853
  1-4  11.78 1.930 13.77 1.178 14.65 0.633
      
 Portfolio  1.60 0.596 5.81  1.127  -3.52 -0.345
      
2. February 17, 2006  2-1   0.54  0.247    6.56   1.572   -0.05 -0.005  
  2-2   0.44  0.155    1.59   0.292    6.62  0.616  
  2-3  -1.41 -0.482   -3.00  -0.536   -7.34 -0.665  
  2-4  -1.27 -0.727    0.72   0.213   -6.68 -1.006  
  2-5  -0.59 -0.307   -1.53  -0.419    2.87  0.397 
  2-6  -0.52 -0.199    8.72   1.739  -3.61 -0.361  
  2-7  -1.01 -0.351    1.41   0.257  -0.03 -0.004
  2-8  -2.35 -1.239   -4.51  -1.242   -8.35 -1.162  
      
  Portfolio  -0.77 -0.727 1.24  0.614   -2.07 -0.517  
      
3. March 10, 2006  3-1  -2.71 -0.467 5.28  0.478  -23.43 -1.071
 3-2  3.16 1.609 4.43  1.177  0.78 0.105
 3-3  -1.25 -0.431 -1.26  -0.226  -4.40 -0.399
 3-4  -0.79 -0.459 0.84  0.256  -1.78 -0.272
 3-5  0.03 0.007 2.10  0.216  -9.37 -0.489
 3-6  -2.13 -0.486 2.28  0.272  8.61 0.520
  3-7  -3.78 -0.272 -5.77 -0.217 -10.45 -0.200
 3-8  -0.24 -0.022 -5.32  -0.254  12.73 0.309
 3-9  0.41 0.166 0.28  0.057  -27.96 -3.011*
      
 Portfolio  -0.81 -0.324 0.32  0.066  -6.14 -0.649
      
4. March 13, 2006  4-1  1.04 0.698 4.93  1.729  -1.94 -0.346
 4-2  0.32 0.213 0.60  0.212  7.89 1.405
 4-3  0.03 0.015 2.73  0.718  -5.52 -0.737
 4-4  1.14 0.593   3.69  1.005  -0.05 -0.007
      
 Portfolio  0.63 0.579 2.99  1.433  0.09 0.023
        19
5. March 14, 2006  5-1  -0.06 -0.022 -1.23 -0.242 -11.41 -1.130
  5-2 0.10 0.038 -3.38  -0.668  -7.90 -0.787
  5-3 -1.20 -0.807 0.26  0.092  7.97 1.418
  5-4 -1.34 -0.549 1.29  0.275  -8.33 -0.899
  5-5 -1.21 -0.699 -1.07  -0.322  -4.86 -0.744
  5-6  0.92 0.213 6.53 0.792 18.91 1.161
  5-7 -1.28 -0.648 1.11  0.294  -6.49 -0.869
  5-8 -0.06 -0.033 2.24  0.611  -1.58 -0.218
  5-9 0.37 0.138 0.01  0.002  -9.78 -0.965
  5-10 0.55 0.105 -5.95  -0.591  -3.88 -0.194
 5-11  0.87 0.574 2.56  0.886  1.88 0.331
      
 Portfolio  -0.21 -0.200 0.22  0.106  -2.32 -0.574
      
6. March 28, 2006  6-1  -2.72 -1.032 -2.56  -0.507  -17.68 -1.772
 6-2  -1.77 -1.183 -3.34  -1.165  0.95 0.166
  6-3  6.26 0.630 10.44 0.548 41.09 1.091
 6-4  -3.69 -1.115 -6.38  -1.006  -3.50 -0.280
      
 Portfolio  -0.48 -0.171 -0.46  -0.086  5.21 0.490
      
7. April 26, 2006  7-1 -2.08 -0.819 -4.29  -0.881  9.00 0.935
  7-2 2.82 1.735 0.16  0.053  -0.60 -0.095
  7-3 2.31 1.108 1.37  0.345  0.60 0.074
  7-4 0.37 0.145 0.58  0.119  -5.46 -0.566
  7-5 0.73 0.482 0.70  0.241  3.94 0.674
  7-6 0.47 0.173 -2.23  -0.428  -6.60 -0.643
  7-7 -0.20 -0.091 2.49  0.578  2.65 0.309
  7-8 2.01 0.371 24.19  2.322*  26.21 1.271
  7-9  -0.75 -0.060 0.13 0.005 24.96 0.524
  7-10  -4.79 -1.587 -7.52 -1.299 -12.86 -1.123
  7-11 0.18 0.111 -2.00  -0.652  -4.86 -0.803
  7-12 -0.23 -0.058 14.22  -1.840  -8.85 -0.580
  7-13  0.01 0.001 -5.24 -0.384 -18.31 -0.680
  7-14  1.83 0.618 -1.76 -0.309 -21.52 -1.906
  7-15  -0.82 -0.386 -2.94 -0.726 -20.12 -2.507*
  7-16 2.65 1.007 5.87  1.165  -14.51 -1.460
  7-17 -1.20 -0.549 5.01  1.200  -10.06 -1.220
  7-18 2.80 1.385 4.29  1.105  1.72 0.229
  7-19 2.32 0.475 3.88  0.416  -0.17 -0.012
  7-20 0.08 0.034 2.32  0.520  -0.06 -0.016
  7-21 -1.94 -0.499 -0.18  -0.024  3.61 0.244
  7-22 -8.09 -3.145* -7.68 -1.559  -3.01 -0.317
  7-23 -1.13 -0.312 -3.57  -0.512    -5.12 -0.372
  7-24 -1.09 -0.687 -0.28  -0.095  0.72 0.120  20
  7-25 -0.85 -0.428 1.87  0.490  3.26 0.433
      
 Portfolio  -0.18 -0.178 0.04  0.019  -2.22 -0.567
      
8. August 25, 2006  8-1  -0.33 -0.162 -2.14  -0.547  2.65 0.342
 8-2  4.25 1.349 3.50  0.581  -8.30 -0.696
 8-3  1.87 0.808 -0.10  -0.024  1.00 0.115
      
 Portfolio  1.93 1.270 0.42  0.145  -1.55 -0.270
      
9. September 7, 2006  9-1  -0.69 -0.350 -3.17  -0.848  -3.32 -0.453
 9-2  -0.50 -0.327 -1.24  -0.424  3.82 0.666
      
 Portfolio  -0.59 -0.449 -2.20  -0.872  0.25 0.050
      
10. September 19, 2006  10-1  1.50 0.854 2.79  0.828  8.47 1.275
 10-2  -0.62 -0.352 0.62  0.185  5.03 0.760
      
 Portfolio  0.44 0.329 1.70  0.666  6.75 1.332
      
11. September 25, 2006  11-1  -0.61 -0.214 -2.65 -0.484 -13.92 -1.284
  11-2 2.57 0.523 8.34  0.887  8.24 0.448
  11-3 1.41 0.859 3.70  1.173  1.18 0.189
  11-4 -0.94 -0.324 -4.42  -0.799  -0.94 -0.090
  11-5 2.31 0.765 -3.72  -0.645  -7.62 -0.668
  11-6 -0.95 -0.450 -0.36  -0.089  -7.27 -0.908
  11-7 -0.36 -0.100 -0.77  -0.111  -1.04 -0.076
  11-8 0.42 0.265 2.28  0.753  0.79 0.133
      
 Portfolio  0.48 0.402 0.30  0.130  -2.57 -0.567
      
12. October 6, 2006  12-1 -0.16 -0.059 -2.83  -0.548  -0.33 -0.032
  12-2 -1.72 -1.166 -1.15  -0.408  5.64 1.016
  12-3 0.70 0.319 -2.34  -0.559  -7.18 -0.865
  12-4  2.49 0.720 11.46 1.734 18.13 1.388
  12-5  0.02 0.004 -9.40 -0.866 -38.61 -1.800
      
 Portfolio  0.27 0.165 -0.85  -0.277  -4.47 -0.735
      
13. December 6, 2006  13-1  -4.31 -0.423 -7.78  -0.401  -36.92 -0.959
 13-2  4.36 1.189 -3.43  -0.487  -2.54 -0.183
      
  Portfolio  0.03 0.005 -5.61 -0.548 -19.73 -0.976
        21
14. December 7, 2006  14-1 0.34 0.187 5.31  1.516  -3.67 -0.531
  14-2 -0.76 -0.382 1.49  0.387  -1.52 -0.202
  14-3 -0.37 -0.264 -0.42  -0.155  -4.49 -0.849
  14-4 0.78 0.345 2.66  0.614  9.36 1.094
  14-5 1.55 0.458 4.95  0.762  5.74 0.450
  14-6  -0.45 -0.285 -0.72 -0.235 -10.43 -1.740
      
 Portfolio  0.18 0.152 2.21  0.969  -0.83 -0.185
      
      
All Events   Portfolio  -0.09 -0.184 0.48  0.534  -2.31 -1.287
          
* Denotes that the CAR is statistically different from zero at least at the 5 percent level.   22
Table 2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for Various Windows Around the 
 Announcements of Votes from Product -Specific Advisory Committee Meetings 
 




Window  (-1, 1) 
Medium Event 
Window  (-5, 5) 
Long Event 
Window (-21, 21) 
   CAR  T-stat  CAR  T-stat  CAR  T-stat 
             
March 8, 2006  1  7.02 1.274 3.84  0.082  -1.84 -0.230
March 13, 2006  2  0.03 0.015 2.73  0.718  -5.52 -0.737
March 14, 2006  3  0.87 0.574 2.56  0.886  1.88 0.331
March 22, 2006  4  1.15 0.404 -33.18  -6.085*  -20.98 -1.949
May 17, 2006  5  1.63 1.052 0.26  0.084  -5.86 -0.982
June 2, 2006  6  2.56 1.304 4.59  1.224  6.64 0.891
September 7, 2006  7  0.60 0.257 2.27  0.511  8.15 0.931
September 7, 2006  8  -38.49 -3.987* -96.30  -5.235*  -22.80 -0.621
September 12, 2006  9  -7.38 -1.041 -15.83  -1.168  12.75 0.477
September 12, 2006  10  -1.54 -0.437 -2.10  -0.312  -13.32 -1.024
September 21, 2006  11  -0.47 -0.190 0.60  0.126  -12.68 -1.356
October  19,  2006  12  4.20 2.038* -3.30 -0.836 -17.47 -2.239*
    
 Portfolio -2.48 -2.013* -11.15  -4.718*  -5.92 -1.266
             
* Denotes that the CAR is statistically different from zero at least at the 5 percent level.  
The meeting on September 7
th is unusual because the clinical studies relied upon by the 
sponsor to support approval of the drug and indication under discussion were submitted 
under Section 505(b)(2) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. (21 U.S.C. section 355(b)(2)).  This 
section of the Act allows the FDA, in certain circumstances, to base approvals of new drugs 
entirely or partially on studies not conducted by the applicant and for which the applicant has not 
obtained a right of reference or use.   The advisory committee meeting was an unusual 
circumstance and was not typical of FDA advisory committee meetings involving specific drug 
products. 
 